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The global justice debate has largely ignored the place of law in a just global order. It has 
focused instead on the issues of human rights, economic inequality, and cultural diversity. 
These are, in essence, issues of the modern liberal state transferred to the global level. But 
resolving them requires institutions that are absent or weak outside states of that kind. To 
argue about achieving justice while ignoring institutions seems optimistic, even naïve. 
Given the challenges to global order, it would make sense for those concerned with global 
justice to give more attention to how the ideals and principles that have shaped that debate 
might be realized in circumstances quite unlike those of modern liberal states. Threats to 
order, domestic and international, invite a more pessimistic, more ‗realistic‘, approach to 
global justice. Such an approach would focus on the requirements of legal order under the 
conditions created by globalization, which include an erosion of government in favor of 
governance that globalization has brought about. Some think effective policy-making is 
more important than legality, but in taking that position they commit themselves to a kind 
of realism in which expediency trumps justice. That is not the kind of realism I will be 
defending here. 
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A just global legal order would be, at a minimum, one in which the rule of law is 
observed within and between states. Globalization, which involves powerful forces and 
rapid change, can threaten legal order by undermining constitutional government and the 
rule of law. Increasingly, those concerned with global order have come to see that legal 
order is also threatened by transnational governance as a response to problems generated 
by globalization. ‗Governance‘ is an ambiguous term, but as commonly used it implies a 
process in which private as well as public organizations make public policy. It implies the 
dispersal and even disappearance of public authority in decision-making networks that 
operate partly or entirely beyond the reach of government. It seems evident that although 
governance can sometimes be an effective way of meeting global challenges, it poses 
challenges of its own. Governance networks are not necessarily more transparent or 
democratic than governments and they easily escape public oversight. How, then, can the 
rule of law be preserved when public authority is eroding internally and internationally? 
How, under the conditions created by globalization, can international law continue as a 
system of ‗inter-public law‘1 or be transformed into a system of global public law?  
My aim in this paper is to sketch a way of thinking about global justice that 
responds to these concerns by illuminating the connection between justice and authority. 
Law is the basis of those non-voluntary associations we call political. It defines not only 
the state but also the international system and its subsystems of regional and functional 
law. These are all structures of authority even if, as in the international case, the structure 
is decentralized. I argue that justice is best understood as a criterion for judging these 
structures—the laws that constitute them and the laws that they create and administer. 
Justice must be distinguished from legal authority, on the one hand, and moral legitimacy, 
on other. These distinctions are important not only within a state but at the international 
and supranational levels as well. Discussions of global justice often miss an important 
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aspect of the topic by obscuring the differences between justice, authority, and legitimacy 
or by ignoring the legal context in which principles of justice are invoked. Theories of 
global governance go even further towards neglecting or depreciating law. Against such 
theories, I argue that global justice requires not ‗governance‘ but a system of international 
or global public law. The global justice debate could become more coherent as well as 
more realistic than it now is if it were to concern itself with the justice of international law 
or with the laws, actual or potential, of an emerging multilevel global polity. 
The argument of this paper is compressed and refers to arguments I‘ve made more 
fully in other papers, some of which are mentioned in the following discussion. I hope the 
reader will charitably overlook gaps in the argument for the sake of getting an overview of 
an approach to global justice that takes the need for legal order more seriously than does 
much of the writing on international ethics in recent years. The revival of legal thought in 
the context of global politics that is evident in the writings of Jürgen Habermas, Otfried 
Höffe, Jean Cohen, and others (including Helga Varden in this symposium) suggests that 
we are leaving a period in which philosophers treated international relations as ‗applied 
ethics‘ and entering a period of inquiry into global justice as a question for legal and 
political theory.  
 
Justice and law 
A commonly accepted view of law is that it consists of rules enacted by public authority. 
These authoritative rules are ‗law‘ in the sense that they are valid or authentic rules within 
a particular legal system. They prescribe obligations and those obligations can if necessary 
be coercively enforced. But rules, even if authoritative in this sense, may be unacceptable 
for other reasons. They may be at odds with prevailing opinion, religious or moral duties, 
or with criteria of genuine legality. The concern, in such cases, is not whether a given law 
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has been authoritatively enacted but whether it is proper for those in authority to have 
enacted it.
2
 Justice, in the context of a debate about existing or proposed laws, involves 
principles for evaluating enacted law and guiding legal change. A theory of justice, so 
understood, would be concerned with those principles.  
 Inquiry into the justice of laws is not, however, a purely moral inquiry. Deciding 
whether a proposed law should be adopted involves judging not only whether the law is 
morally acceptable but also whether it is appropriate as part of the legal system it would 
alter. That judgment depends in part on considerations arising from the requirement that a 
new law must be compatible with existing laws. It can amend or replace those laws but it 
must also conform to their underlying principles. Beyond meeting the test of technical 
consistency, it must not contradict the integrity and coherence of the legal order to which 
it belongs. Such considerations may be mutable, uncertain, and contested, but these are the 
problems of any interpretive and evaluative discourse. There will, then, always be some 
space between moral and legal rights and obligations. Liberal moralists often go straight 
from moral principles to political conclusions, ignoring considerations of this kind and 
erasing the distinction between moral legitimacy and political right.  
The claim that a state or international institution cannot be ‗legitimate‘ unless it 
meets a certain standard of justice may, then, be correct as a moral proposition. But it is 
false as a political claim because it fails to distinguish moral from political legitimacy. An 
‗unjust‘ state can be politically legitimate if it provides basic political order. It may be able 
to provide a measure of economic security and personal freedom even if its laws impose 
limits on civil rights, and its laws may be consistent with widely held moral beliefs even if 
its constitution is undemocratic. In a pluralist international order, sovereignty cannot be 
divorced from legal and political facts and made solely a matter of abstract, noncontextual 
moral judgment. Bhutan, China, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam were all ranked low in 
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a recent Freedom House survey.
3
 Are these illegitimate states? The claim that because 
such states are open to moral criticism they are without moral legitimacy, and that lacking 
moral legitimacy their governments are not justified in exercising political authority, 
moves from morality to politics without taking account of law, history, or the conditions 
of legal order. Making political authority contingent on moral legitimacy would not, as 
liberal moralists imagine, result in a more just world. Such ‗political moralism‘, as 
Bernard Williams calls it,
4
 can lead to simplistic judgments, moralistic intolerance, and 
imperial delusions. It has resulted in costly unjustified wars to overthrow offensive 
regimes in situations that fail (as in Iraq) to meet recognized criteria for humanitarian 
intervention.
5
 International law, despite its flaws, constitutes a reasonable response to 
moral, cultural, and political diversity, and a theory of global justice should start by 
accepting rather than rejecting its basic principles.   
 Discussion of whether a law or a set of laws is ‗just‘ is most intelligible in relation 
to the legal order it might alter when it is sensitive to the circumstances of justice, that is, 
to the contingent conditions for achieving justice in a particular community.
6
 One of these 
is certainly that a community should have laws, even if those laws fall short when judged 
by a standard of moral legitimacy. For there to be a point to political deliberation on the 
justice of its laws, a community must enjoy a reasonable level of accord on what the law 
is. There cannot be irresolvable disagreement over procedures for determining legal (and 
therefore political) authority, and the legal system must be reasonably effective. If these 
conditions are not met there is civil war, not civil order. A modern legal order is an 
autonomous order of rules. It must operate according to its own procedures and enjoy an 
authority that is independent of religious, moral, or other non-legal criteria of legitimacy. 
Its rationale is to provide the basis for coexistence in circumstances of religious and moral 
disagreement. Citizens must be related as subjects of a common law, not as adherents to a 
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common faith or stakeholders in an economic enterprise. This means that citizens and, 
especially, public officials must regard the laws as autonomous and authoritative. Law 
cannot be treated solely as an instrument for pursuing shared purposes, for this would 
mean that those associated were associated on the basis of those purposes, not on the basis 
of law as a framework for association independent of particular purposes. Nor can laws be 
said to be authoritative only if they correspond to a higher religious or moral law. Laws 
cannot be made, interpreted, or enforced according to standards outside the legal system 
(unless the system has incorporated them) or by persons other than those authorized to 
exercise legal powers. The claim that only substantively desirable or morally legitimate 
laws can have authority and prescribe duties implies that undesirable or illegitimate laws 
can be ignored or violated. It fails to grasp that legal authority is needed most when people 
differ about what is desirable or morally legitimate. These are obvious points about the 
limits of ‗justice‘ as a constraint on law.  
A theory of justice must distinguish principles that could properly be enacted as 
law from those that could not. A principle might have moral force yet be unsuitable as law 
because the state has no business prescribing or enforcing it. What distinguishes the idea 
of justice from other moral ideas is that it is concerned with prescriptions a government 
could make legally obligatory without unreasonably limiting liberty, invading privacy, or 
contradicting other laws. At the international level, the claims of political sovereignty and 
self-determination must also be considered. Understood in this way, the scope of ‗justice‘ 
is narrower than that of utility (that is, of instrumental desirability) or divine, customary, 
or rational ‗morality‘ (noninstrumental propriety). A just law must be morally defensible, 
but it does not follow that every moral ideal or principle should be prescribed as law. So, 
for example, marital fidelity or personal sobriety may be defensible as moral ideals, but it 
is not the business of law to enforce them unless the failure to live up to them violates 
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someone‘s rights. In liberal political thought, principles of justice are grounded on the idea 
of equal liberty. A moral argument becomes political when it is about whether a principle 
could reasonably be adopted in particular circumstances. This involves practical concerns 
as well as those based on abstract moral or philosophical arguments. Political deliberation, 
like adjudication and administration, requires choosing rules as well as interpreting them, 
and it requires exercising judgment and prudence in doing so.   
A theory of justice, then, is a theory of politics as well as morality.
7
 It identifies the 
kinds of obligations that law can properly prescribe and enforce. One can argue that these 
obligations rest on the moral principle that human beings must not coercively obstruct one 
another‘s actions. If one person does obstruct another, the latter may rightly use force to 
resist it if force is necessary to thwart the interference.
8
 A legal order that builds on this 
principle protects the freedom of its members from unwarranted coercive interference. A 
primary task of government is to protect the rights of legal subjects against ‗violence‘ (in 
the strict sense of wrongful coercion) from one another and from outsiders. The rationale 
of the state is not simply that people are better off in civil society than in a state of nature 
but also that the civil condition is morally required. The moral right to be free presupposes 
laws that protect one from being used, against one‘s will, to satisfy someone else‘s desires. 
The basic moral rationale of law is to prevent persons or governments from interfering 
improperly with freedom. A just law is, at a minimum, one that is consistent with this 
rationale. The rules of a private association may restrict freedom in other ways because 
people are free not to be members of such an association. But law must respect freedom 
because a state is not a voluntary association. 
Instead of developing or defending this understanding of justice, however, I want 
to focus on how the conception of legal order it implies might work at the international 
level.
9
 At that level, as in a state, we can ask what purposes governments should pursue 
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and what these purposes imply for the responsibilities of officials and citizens. And as 
supranational institutions develop, similar questions can be asked about the purposes and 
responsibilities of these institutions as well. These include questions about the justice of 
international and global law. Arguments about global justice must be concerned with the 
public institutions through which principles of justice will be realized and with the proper 
purposes of those institutions. Such arguments have the potential to reinvigorate the global 
justice debate. That debate has become a repetitive one in which questions of distributive 
justice, cultural pluralism, and national versus cosmopolitan imperatives are endlessly 
canvassed while the question whether any of the principles advanced in those discussions 
could properly be enforced as law is neglected.
10
 Efforts to restore a concern with law—
with the potential and limitations of legal institutions and the importance of maintaining 
legality in the circumstances of globalization—might prove theoretically illuminating as 
well as practically valuable.  
The case for global justice is often premised on the factual or moral liabilities of 
the state in an age of globalization. Some argue that states are becoming less important as 
sovereignty erodes, transnational relationships flourish, and problems requiring global 
solutions multiply. Others argue that national boundaries are becoming morally irrelevant. 
They see states as an obstacle to a just world order based on respect for human rights and 
an equitable distribution of wealth. But the judgment that globalization has made states 
obsolete, actually or morally, is wildly off the mark. States have not vanished, nor have 
they lost political legitimacy even when they are ineffective or unjust. Citizens and public 
officials have legal rights and responsibilities that cannot be overlooked, and international 
law remains important and legitimate in regulating transactions between states. Thinking 
clearly about justice and authority above the state level means thinking about international 
as well as global law and politics.  
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It follows from the general understanding of justice defined as legitimate coercion 
that a theory of international justice must say when one state can rightly use force against 
another. But questions about the legitimate use of military force are not limited to the use 
of force by states. As international institutions acquire authority and power, such questions 
will arise for them as well. Focusing on the justice of international institutions connects 
arguments about international justice with those about civil society, creating a new context 
for theorizing global justice. A theory of justice beyond the state will need to clarify the 
relationship between civil, international, and supranational justice to address the proper 
aims, powers, and responsibilities of international institutions.  
Political and legal theorists have long debated the implications of shifting political 
authority from states to supranational institutions and have puzzled over the constitutional 
structure of those institutions. Kant thought that the most reasonable supranational order 
would be a confederal union of republican states. By ‗republic‘ he meant a state in which 
executive and legislative powers are constitutionally separate, in contrast to one in which 
these powers are united in a single office, which he called despotic. Republics are more 
likely than despotisms to conduct their affairs according to the rule of law and to respect 
and ensure civil liberty.
11
 The Kantian union is a loose confederal one in which each 
member state remains independent. This is important not only because (as almost every 
commentator observes) a single world state might turn out to be despotic but also because 
republican states have a right to independence. Only a republican state can secure justice 
on the basis of the rule of law, which means that it cannot be legitimately replaced by any 
state or confederation of states that is not itself republican. For Kant, a confederation of 
republican states, united in a way that preserved the republican character of its members, 
is consistent with the idea of the state as a system of public right. The question is whether 
there are other arrangements that are consistent with this idea. 
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These Kantian themes permeate discussions of the European Union and the United 
Nations. Globalization, however, has moved current debates about world order away from 
the idea of confederation to consider alternative kinds of legal order. These are evident in 
international human rights law, the application of foreign, transnational, international, and 
supranational law in national courts, and the proliferation of specialized tribunals to settle 
disputes arising under legal regimes governing international and transnational activities. 
Taken together, some argue, these changes suggest the emergence of a global legal order 
that must be distinguished from classical international law, even if the shape of that order 
is not yet clear. Theorists disagree about the content, authority, and justice of the rules of 
this order. They also disagree about what constitutionalism means and how it might work 
at the global level. Because the idea of constitutional government is contested even in its 
original context, the modern state, we can expect disagreements to multiply when the idea 
is brought into debates about global law. One might argue, for example, that the word 
‗constitution‘ connotes at least a minimum of coherence and that global law, if it exists at 
all, fails to achieve that coherence.  
 
Models of global legal order  
If justice presupposes the idea of legitimate coercion, global justice needs to be related to 
that idea. One way to do this is to treat global justice as an aspect of the rule of law. The 
expression ‗rule of law‘, when it is more than merely an empty phrase or partisan slogan, 
identifies a distinct type of human relationship. It is a relationship premised on the idea of 
equal liberty, not one in which the purposes of some are imposed on others.
12
 Whatever its 
uses in political debate, the idea of the rule of law is useful to theorists as a criterion for 
identifying different kinds of political association. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
the rule of law entails respect for equal liberty, we can ask how a global legal order could 
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be constituted to ensure it and, in particular, whether the constitution of that order should 
be unitary, international, or confederal. This inquiry suggests alternative models of global 
law, blending into one another at the margins but nevertheless distinguishable.  
 The first of these alternatives is a single, global, civil order. According to what 
might be called ‗the cosmopolitan model‘, global justice presupposes either a centralized 
system of authority (a world state) or a looser order that is nevertheless in important ways 
supranational, not international. Those who shy away from the idea of a world state prefer 
expressions like ‗global covenant‘ or ‗global commonwealth‘. 13 Perhaps a key element—
one implied by the word ‗civil‘—is that natural persons would have rights and duties 
under its legal regime. This global order would protect civil freedom and ensure economic 
and social conditions under which people are reasonably able to exercise that freedom. At 
a minimum, it would have to prevent situations in which many people were systematically 
excluded from citizenship and therefore from the rights and liberties that go with it, 
including the protection of law.
14
 Government may cede much to ‗governance‘ in some 
versions of this model but it remains a model of legal order to the degree that governance 
operates within a framework of law. Because the model is cosmopolitan institutionally as 
well as morally, it is concerned with supranational authority as well as with justice. It is 
concerned with constitutional structure or ‗architecture‘ of the global regime within which 
principles of justice are pursued, and with the proper purposes of that regime. These are 
fundamental concerns of political and legal order, and theorists of global justice cannot 
ignore them.  
The second alternative is an association of states on the basis of international law. 
In this ‗international model‘ states retain their independence and interact within the limits 
of public international law, understood as the ‗classical‘ system that existed before the 
incorporation of human rights and individual responsibility. This classical system was 
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concerned with the rights and responsibilities of states—not citizens, whose interests were 
protected only indirectly. If, for example, a state was found to be responsible for injuries 
to citizens of another state, it owed redress not to them but to their government. Political 
officials could not be held personally liable for crimes, including crimes against humanity, 
committed while they were in office. The international model is ‗civil‘ only in the sense 
that states are the ‗citizens‘ of the community constituted by classical international law. 
That law did not confer rights or impose duties on individuals or require states to respect 
principles of civil liberty or constitutional government internally. If we acknowledge that 
the freedom it postulates is the freedom of states, not their subjects, and ignore its defects 
as a system of law, international law can be said to represent the rule of law in a society of 
states because it does respect the liberties of its subjects, that is, states.  
The third model, which I will call the ‗civil-confederal‘, responds to the objection 
that the international model is civil only by analogy by postulating an association of states 
whose members adhere to republican principles internally as well as in their relations with 
one another. Its advocates include Kant, Rawls, and theorists of European unity who see 
the European Union as a model for the world as a whole.
15
 Such a confederation would 
require not only that member states interact with one another on the basis of the rule of 
law but also that each state be governed according to the rule of law internally. The civil-
confederal model has global relevance because a civil confederation of civil states could 
become universal. But the model has a dark side because it sets up an opposition between 
a civil confederation, whose members meet the criteria for membership, and other states, 
which do not. In the context of real-world politics, the result can be an ideology according 
to which the members of a ‗league‘ or ‗concert‘ of democracies, confident of their moral 
superiority, see themselves as justified in ‗spreading democracy‘ by means of military 
intervention.
16
 As noted earlier, the claim that grounds this interventionist ideology is that 
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a state cannot be politically sovereign unless it is morally legitimate. It is permissible for 
states to establish a confederation to govern their relations with one another, but they 
cannot rewrite the rules by which other states are governed.
17
 Until it becomes universal, 
members of the civil confederation must conduct their relations with other states on the 
basis of international law. An advantage of the international model is that it allows room 
for diversity by prohibiting aggression and imperial domination. Its disadvantage is that it 
must tolerate injustices within states unless they rise to a level that justifies humanitarian 
intervention.  
The civil-confederal model is based on European thinking and experience. An 
issue in debates on Europe‘s future is the degree to which supranational law has emerged 
within the Union. It seems evident that a new legal order of some kind is emerging, even if 
it is hard to pin down its identity, and giving rise to discussions of the justice of its laws. 
From the standpoint of cosmopolitanism, however, a civil-confederal association is not a 
civil order because member states retain their independence. Even if its membership were 
universal, such a confederation would fall short of being a world state. It would remain a 
hybrid of domestic and international law.
18
 For cosmopolitans, a global polity implies a 
single legal order, no matter how complex and multilayered. What cosmopolitans fail to 
see, however, is that international law is in fact a single legal order and that confederation 
simply strengthens it. So long as an arrangement is ‗confederal‘ it is also ‗international‘. 
So even if a civil confederation were to become universal, in the sense that all states were 
members, the world would still be one whose institutions were significantly international.  
In contrast to theories of transnational or global governance, all three models give 
a central place to public law. They postulate government according to law, not network 
governance. Denying this postulate generates a fourth, ‗global governance‘, model. 
Governance relies on professional or commercial self-regulation, technical standard 
 14 
setting, arbitration, and other arrangements for making rules and settling disputes outside 
the framework of public deliberation. Some see transnational governance as the modern 
equivalent of the medieval lex mercatoria, merchant law, a system of customary private 
commercial law that favored speedy and equitable settlement of disputes over procedural 
regularity and public accountability.
19
 Many who are attracted to the idea of governance 
argue that private or mixed public-private networks are more effective than governmental 
or intergovernmental institutions in managing policy. They imagine a benign ‗new world 
order‘ constituted by these networks rather than by public international law, confederal 
institutions, or a global public law. But the worldwide financial crisis that began in 2008 
reminds us that network policy-making can be dangerous if not properly regulated.  
In my view, the idea of governance obscures the distinction between law and non-
law, between the public and private realms, and between noninstrumental and instrumental 
considerations in policy-making.
20
 Those who regard law as an instrument of policy fail to 
appreciate not only its importance as a procedural constraint on policy-making but also the 
role of public law in integrating separate regulatory regimes into a coherent legal order. 
Relying on ‗private authority‘—which means giving legal responsibilities to corporations, 
interest groups, and professional societies—weakens public authority by putting important 
activities beyond the reach of public oversight. A unified system of public international 
law is replaced by a patchwork of instrumental public-private international regimes, each 
devoted to furthering the goals and interests of its most influential participants. The idea of 
legal sovereignty, which was invented in early modern Europe as a response to conflicting 
claims by many different secular and ecclesiastical authorities, may need to be reinvented 
in response to the equally anarchic contests of current international affairs.  
To avoid the problems that critics see in the practices of global governance, public 
law models allow for public control not by assigning all functions to public agencies but 
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by subjecting performance of those functions to public regulation. Therefore, to assert the 
importance of public law is not to deny a place for ‗governance‘ in an emerging system of 
global law. Governance practices can move the world towards public legal order indirectly 
by increasing the density of transactions and relationships over which legal control must 
eventually be asserted. It is on grounds like these that some legal theorists have suggested 
that global legal order can grow form informal rule-making and dispute settlement within 
private functional regimes or networks. There is a Kantian teleology here: what needs to 
happen will eventually happen because human beings are driven to overcome obstacles to 
realizing their potential as moral beings who must live together according to law, not on 
the basis of relative power. Different functional regimes will have to be made consistent. 
Systems of private authority and rule making must become transparent and accountable, 
not only in functional or regional regimes but also throughout the emerging ‗polycentric 
system‘ of global governance. Informal, quasi-legal processes may replace legislation and 
treaty making as sources of global law, but the new sources they generate must eventually 
be reshaped into a coherent juridical order.
21
  
This optimistic view of global governance may be overly deterministic, but at least 
it recognizes the problems of fragmentation and deformalization that critics of the current 
system of international law see as evidence of its disintegration.
22
 It acknowledges that 
private authority is not a new form of authority but a repetition of old patterns such as 
feudalism, syndicalism, and organized crime. The only way to assure the rule of law and 
public accountability as elements of a just global order is to bring informal and extra-legal 
ways of settling disputes and distributing benefits under the jurisdiction of public law. 
This does not mean suppressing self-regulation but it does mean subjecting it to public 
oversight and, in doing so, asserting the normative priority of public over private rules. 
The activities regulated and even a degree of oversight can remain in private hands, for 
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industry associations, human rights NGOs, and other extra-governmental agencies can 
sometimes regulate transactions, deliver services, and settle disputes more efficiently than 
governments. But these activities and the regimes through which they are managed must 
be compatible with general public law and subject to public regulation.  
 
Global law and justice 
Besides public accountability, a global legal order requires a degree of formal unity and 
coherence. There must be a constitutional framework within which the laws of different 
regional and functional regimes are made reasonably consistent. But consistency does not 
require a single office of sovereign authority. Sovereignty can be dispersed, as is the case 
in modern states and, arguably, international law. What is constituted, however, must be a 
system of public law that identifies and allocates legislative, judicial, and administrative 
powers.  
If we see global governance as a precursor of global law, rather than an alternative 
to it, the cosmopolitan and civil-confederal models may seem unduly rigid. They require 
arrangements that can only be established in moments of constitutional choice. The global 
governance model allows for a messier process in which law is first displaced by private 
regulation, mixed decision-making, ‗soft law‘, and other quasi-legal practices and norms, 
but subsequently restored as they are gradually juridified. But these practices and norms 
cannot contribute to the emergence of global law unless juridification occurs. It cannot be 
claimed that governance networks constitute a legal order unless that order distinguishes 
spheres of public and private activity, defines and allocates public authority, and secures 
the superiority of public over private offices.
23
 This is the basic rationale for public law, a 
rationale that is at issue not only in governance debates but also in disagreements between 
legal and political constitutionalists. The issue here is whether limits on public authority 
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are best established legally, through judicial review, or politically, by asserting legislative 
powers against administrative and judicial rule. Political constitutionalism is an effort to 
defend democracy against those who identify constitutional government with civil liberty 
and the rule of law.
 24
 Democratic government, however, must operate in a way that does 
not transgress limits set by rule-of-law criteria, which not only forbid secret or retroactive 
laws, penalties beyond those provided for by law, arbitrary exemptions from law, and the 
like but that also, at a deeper level, ensure across-the-board respect for the rights of legal 
subjects.  
Even in the absence of a universal state or confederation, a global legal order can 
be said to have its constitution in public international law, which since the United Nations 
was established has not only acquired institutional shape but is changing from a system of 
inter-state law into one that includes elements of civil law. This transformation can be 
seen in several emerging practices. First, in contrast to the classical system, international 
law today recognizes and enforces individual rights and holds individuals responsible for 
crimes against humanity and other wrongs. Second, international law is increasingly a 
system in which courts and tribunals apply not only international but also transnational 
and foreign law. Whatever the merits or otherwise of this practice, the result is to connect 
different legal systems in ways that go beyond those of classical international law.
25
 And 
third, as some defenders of the global governance model recognize needs to happen, 
international law is reasserting public control over transnational networks and institutions. 
Although most advocates of global governance challenge the distinction between 
law and non-law and regard public international law as irrelevant, others defend its 
autonomy and continued importance. They understand that strengthening global law will 
require bringing transnational self-regulation and dispute settlement under the jurisdiction 
of international law. It will require subjecting those practices to international regulation. 
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To the objection that they exaggerate its unity and coherence, those who see international 
law as being transformed into a global legal order respond that the theorist‘s job is to find 
the coherence implicit in the complexity of actual practices. Whether transnational private 
commercial law or other quasi-legal practices will acquire the marks of genuine legality is 
a contingent question that cannot be answered by a theory. But theory can require that a 
legal order display at least a degree of consistency and hierarchy, no matter how complex 
and decentralized that order may be, if it is to qualify as a legal system. A legal system is 
more than an aggregate of independent, unrelated regional and functional regimes. It must 
unite these regimes into a coherent system on the basis of agreed criteria and procedures 
for reconciling their different rules and decisions. One may doubt that anything more than 
a metaphorical global constitution has yet emerged, but it is hard to dispute the conclusion 
that the global order that exists is substantially constituted by public international law.  
A theory of global public law must identify the rules and institutions at various 
levels that are related hierarchically according to its ‗constitutional‘ principles. These are 
found in customary international law and in treaties that codify that law. They are also 
found in the United Nations Charter, in the Charter of the International Criminal Court, 
and in widely acknowledged principles of human rights (even if their acknowledgement is 
sometimes hypocritical). The result is international law understood in a less state-centric 
way than in the classical system. As that system has been modified by transnational and 
supranational principles, what has emerged is a global legal order in which not only states 
but also other legal persons, including natural persons, have legal rights and duties. The 
law of the European Union provides clues to understanding the character, problems, and 
potential of global public law. 
Law, I began by arguing, entails the possibility of coercion because it prescribes 
obligations and must therefore provide ways to ensure compliance when those obligations 
 19 
are not fulfilled. To discuss the justice of a community‘s laws is to discuss the kinds of 
obligations that could appropriately be prescribed and enforced as law in that community. 
The propriety of enforcing particular obligations within a community depends, however, 
on its character as a community and the purposes ascribed to its governing institutions. 
This applies to the international community as much as to any other. The question, here, is 
not the constitutional form of the international community or the authority or effectiveness 
of its institutions but their proper purpose. Is that purpose to regulate relations between 
states and transactions between the subjects of different states? Or is it to pursue policies 
affecting the good of the international community? If both, how should these purposes be 
reconciled? Political theorists have long debated whether the modern state should provide 
a framework of non-instrumental laws enabling people to pursue their own ends, or should 
instead pursue collective religious, economic, or other ends by enacting laws designed to 
achieve them. As institutions develop at the international level, we can expect similar 
disagreements about the purposes of those institutions and the views of global community 
those purposes imply. 
 The global justice debate has been preoccupied with policy issues and hampered 
by using the word ‗justice‘ loosely and uncritically. The debate could be improved by 
linking it, as Rawls and Habermas have done, to a discussion of principles for a pluralistic 
global legal community. Adopting this suggestion would help to focus the discussion of 
global justice by connecting questions of economic equality and cultural identity with the 
question of how to secure individual rights and limited government within a system of 
global law. Ending gross injustices will require a well-ordered world in which individuals 
and communities can coexist in a condition of genuine legality. The question of global 
justice is best discussed in relation to how public authority in such a world should be 






 Benedict Kingsbury, ‗International Law as Inter-Public Law‘, in Henry S. Richardson 
and Melissa S. Williams, eds., Moral Universalism and Pluralism, NOMOS 49 (New 
York: New York University Press, 2009), pp. 167–204.  
2
 Michael Oakeshott, ‗The Rule of Law‘, in On History and Other Essays (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983), pp. 140–41. What Oakeshott calls ‗civil association‘ is a non-voluntary 
mode of association, in the sense that noninstrumental laws prescribe obligations and are 
not merely recommendations or advice, but it is not inherently coercive. Coercion enters 
the picture only because a state cannot work if its laws are not observed, and enforcement 
may be required to secure that observance. Coercion is one of the contingent conditions 
for the existence of civil association, but it is not itself part of the civil mode. 
3
 Arch Puddington, ‗The 2008 Freedom House Survey: A Third Year of Decline‘, Journal 
of Democracy, 20 (2009), pp. 93–107. On Rwanda, see Philip Gourevitch, ‗The Life 
After‘, The New Yorker (May 4, 2009), pp. 36–49.  
4
 Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political 
Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 1–17.  
5
 Jean L. Cohen, ‗Whose Sovereignty? Empire vs. international law‘, Ethics & 
International Affairs, 18 (2004), pp. 1–24, and ‗Sovereign Equality vs. Imperial Right: 
The Battle over the ―New World Order‖‘, Constellations, 13 (2006), pp. 485–505.  
6
 By ‗circumstances of justice‘ I mean, following Rawls, the existence of different beliefs 
and values in a situation in which collective decisions need to be made. John Rawls, A 




 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3. 
Arthur Ripstein develops a Kantian argument along these lines in Force and Freedom: 
Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
8
 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 132–35. 
9
 For further consideration of these themes in the context of international relations, see 
Terry Nardin, ‗Justice and Coercion‘, in Alex J. Bellamy, ed., International Society and its 
Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 247–63, and ‗International Political 
Theory and the Question of Justice‘, International Affairs, 82 (2006), pp. 449–65.  
10
 An exception is Thomas Nagel, who defends what he calls a ‗political conception‘ of 
justice as arising from the fact that because the state imposes obligations on its citizens, 
those obligations must respond to basic considerations of fairness and equality. Thomas 
Nagel, ‗The Problem of Global Justice‘, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33 (2005), p. 120.  
11
 Kant, Political Writings, p. 100. 
12
 I defend this understanding of the rule of law in Terry Nardin, ‗Emergency Logic: 
Prudence, Morality, and the Rule of Law‘, in Victor V. Ramraj, ed., Emergencies and the 
Limits of Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 97–117, and 
‗Theorizing the International Rule of Law‘, Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), 
pp. 385–401.  
13
 David Held, Democracy and Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) and Global 
Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2004); Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 




 Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community, 
trans. Jeffrey Flynn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), p. 122. 
15
 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Though 
he confines his argument to a potential European federation, Friedrich Hayek makes the 
interesting argument that confederal government is more suited to protecting individual 
liberty than a unitary state. See F. A. Hayek, ‗The Economic Conditions of Interstate 
Federalism‘, in Individualism and Economic Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1949), pp. 255–72. 
16
 See Beate Jahn, ‗Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs‘, 
International Organization 59 (2005), pp. 177–207; Kishore Mahbubani, ‗The Dangers of 
Democratic Delusions‘, Ethics & International Affairs, 23 (2009), pp.19–25. 
17
 Chandran Kukathas, ‗The Mirage of Global Justice‘, Social Philosophy and Policy, 23 
(2006), pp. 1-28. Kukathas is criticizing the reform interventionist arguments of Thomas 
Pogge and Allen Buchanan, among others. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human 
Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002) and Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and 
Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).   
18
 Jürgen Habermas, ‗A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society‘ in Ciaran 
Cronin, trans., Between Naturalism and Religion (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), pp. 312–52, 
and ‗The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for World Society‘, Constellations, 15 (2008), pp. 444–55. 
19
 On lex mercatoria as a model for global legal order, see the essays in Gunther Teubner, 




 Terry Nardin, ‗Globalization and the Public Realm‘, Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 12 (2009), pp. 297–312. 
21
 Gunther Teubner, ‗Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred 
Constitutional Theory?‘, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther Teubner, 
eds., Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 
pp. 3–28. Teubner repeats an argument made David Mitrany in 1932 and by others after 
1945 with respect to European integration. ‗The transfer of functions from the domestic to 
the international field has been apt to run further and faster than the corresponding change 
in legal doctrine‘. David Mitrany, ‗The Progress of International Government‘, in The 
Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1975), p. 96. The implication is 
that law can and must catch up.  
22
 Martti Koskenniemi, ‗The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics‘, Modern Law Review, 70 (2007), pp. 1–30. 
23
 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
24
 For example, Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of 
the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
25
 Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009), pp. 187–209. 
